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 1. Introduction 
 
Boards of directors are believed to influence corporate performance.  Such influence may be 
direct, e.g., through boards monitoring management, or indirect; through the actions of a 
CEO selected by the board.  Various structural characteristics of boards are often argued to 
influence - either positively or negatively - corporate financial performance.  Previous 
empirical literature has typically examined the influence of three such characteristics of 
boards on corporate performance: 
 
 board leadership - whether or not the board chairperson is an executive,  
 board composition - representation of outsider (typically non-executive) directors on 
boards, and 
 board size - the number of board members. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review studies that have sought to relate board leadership, 
composition or size to corporate financial performance.  The arguments relating to these 
board characteristics and each of their relationships with financial performance are reviewed 
in the next section of this paper.  For each characteristic, I then analyse all existing studies 
with the aid of meta-analysis. Results for each board characteristic are then discussed.   
 
 
2. Board Leadership, Composition and Size: The Arguments 
 
2.1 CEO Duality  
CEO duality is usually deemed to occur when the board chair of a company is also its chief 
executive officer.  Those arguing in favour of CEO duality adopt the argument that duality 
leads to increased effectiveness, which will be reflected in improved company performance.  
CEO duality is seen to result in a situation where there is a clear leader of the organisation 
and where there is no room for doubt as to who has authority or responsibility over a 
particular matter (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, Anderson and Anthony, 1986).  Given this, it 
has been proposed that separation of board chair and CEO roles “is guaranteed to produce 
chaos both within the organization and in relationships with the board” (Anderson and 
Anthony, 1986, p.54).  In the event that such “chaos” does ensue, it would be likely that this 
would have a detrimental effect upon the formulation of corporate strategy and the 
responsiveness of the company to changes in the external environment.  Both of these factors 
could potentially contribute to poor corporate financial performance. 
 
In contrast to arguments in favour of CEO duality, more compelling and numerous arguments 
have been proposed against this structure.  In particular, those arguing against CEO duality 
typically propose that it leads to a situation where the governance role of the board of  
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 directors is compromised.  The argument against CEO duality is aptly put in the following 
quote: 
 
In a company where the chairman is also the CEO ... power concentrated in one 
individual and possibilities for checking and balancing powers of the CEO ... are 
virtually eliminated.  In such a corporation, the board may not be able to function as 
an independent body - independent from the influences of top management 
(Chaganti et al, 1985, p.407). 
 
As mentioned above - in relation to CEO dominance - board independence may be critical in 
ensuring that a CEO does not follow strategies which are detrimental to corporate survival.  
Aside from the above argument it is also proposed that the separation of CEO and board chair 
roles is necessary because one person cannot perform both roles effectively.  Stewart (1991) 
in her study of the relationships between board chairs and CEOs comments that “both the 
chairman and general manger have a distinctive domain” (p.523). 
 
A further argument for separating the roles of chairperson and CEO concerns the relative role 
expectations on each.  In contrast to the CEO, who is involved in the day-to-day management 
of the company, the board chair “is often involved in special planning assignments, in policy 
review and formulation and in public and stockholder relations” (Chaganti et al, p.408).  It is 
likely that, given his or her day to day executive commitments, the CEO will not be able to 
effectively perform the additional roles of chairperson.  This is likely to be particularly so 
during times of crisis.  Furthermore, some of the benefits which the CEO can obtain from 
having a chairperson will inevitably be absent when the roles are combined.  For example 
Stewart (1991, p.522) has highlighted several roles of chairpersons, including mentoring 
(acting as a coach and counsellor positively seeking to influence the [CEOs] behaviours), and 
consultant (giving advice to the CEO and other directors). 
 
Hambrick and D’Aveni’s (1992) study of 57 bankrupt firms and 57 matched survivors found 
that CEO dominance - operationalised as the ratio of the CEO’s cash compensation to the 
average compensation of other members of the top management team - was a significant 
predictor of bankruptcy.  Hambrick and D’Aveni’s (1992) sample was also used by Daily and 
Dalton (1994b), which found that CEO duality - which can be seen as another measure of 
chief executive dominance - was a significant predictor of bankruptcy.  CEO duality can be 
seen as one means by which chief executive officers can wield greater control over the 
direction of companies and, in particular, over those persons also charged with determining 
the future direction of the company (other directors) and achieving the objectives of the 
company (other executives).  It is therefore not surprising that Hambrick (1991) sees CEO 
duality as a means of power hoarding, which has in turn been linked to inferior corporate 
performance (Miller and Friesen, 1977). 
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 One argument proposed for the separation of CEO and chairperson roles is that - in the case 
of a poorly performing company - “it is not immediately clear what process would be relied 
on to remove CEO/board” (Daily and Dalton, 1994a, p.645).  This is because the CEO who is 
also board chair is assumed to have a board which largely defers to him or her.  Interestingly, 
research by Harrison, Torres and Kukalis (1988) indicates that it is more difficult to replace 
either the CEO or board chair when these roles are separated, than when the two roles are 
held by one individual. 
 
Taking an agency theory perspective, Daily and Dalton (1994a) propose that separating the 
roles of CEO and chairperson “reduces the opportunity for the CEO and inside directors to 
exercise behaviours which are self-serving and costly to the firm’s owners” (p.645). 
 
Another argument against CEO duality is that it lessens organisations ability to adapt to 
change (Daily and Dalton, 1994a).  In this regard, Argenti (1986) gives autocratic leadership 
and CEO duality among the management defects which can contribute to eventual failure: 
 
An autocratically run company that also has not responded to change is plainly in 
jeopardy, for it means that the autocrat himself has almost certainly failed to notice 
how the world has changed.  He is the company: if he has not understood some new 
trend in the business environment then the company is doomed.  It might not 
happen for years, or it might be tomorrow.  It only needs some stroke of bad luck to 
expose the fatal flaw that his company has been allowed to develop (Argenti, 1986, 
p.101). 
 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) also propose that separating the roles of CEO and chairperson 
has compelling benefits, including increasing a board’s ability to prevent crisis and 
enhancing the ability of the board to act quickly during times of crisis. 
 
 
2.2 Outsider Directors 
As with the CEO duality debate it is often proposed that inside directors cannot be relied on 
to impartially monitor their own performance.  In contrast, outsiders are seen to be 
independent, and therefore impartial, as well as benefiting a company by representing 
alternative perspectives and enhancing the expertise of directors in general (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
 
Sheppard (1994) proposes that outside directors “provide an indicator of the board’s 
orientation toward its external environment ... and thus its ability to respond to change” 
(p.801).  The inability to respond to change is one of the major causes of corporate decline 
(Miller, 1990).  It therefore appears reasonable to propose that corporations having fewer 
outside directors will be less able to perceive and respond to change in the external 
environment, and therefore be more likely perform poorly.  As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)  
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 note, increased environmental pressure means that organisations will require more support 
from outside constituencies.  One means by which such support can be gained is through 
outside directors and their network of contacts (Borch and Huse, 1993). 
 
The turnaround literature indicates that replacement of top management is a major 
prerequisite for major strategic change.  In the New Zealand context, Addison and Hamilton 
(1988) found that the top ranked turnaround strategy was to change top managers (used in 77 
per cent of turnarounds).  Also, Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1990) found that 85 per cent 
of their “sharpbenders” - which were defined as “companies, of different sizes, that have 
been in relative decline with regard to their industry and have managed a sharp and sustained 
recovery” (p.116) - instituted major changes in management. 
 
One of the advantages of outside directors is that, in contrast to inside directors, they are 
more able and willing to support changes in top management.  In this regard Boeker (1992) 
found that boards with a higher proportion of outsiders were more likely to dismiss CEOs of 
poorly performing companies.  As Daily (1994) comments “outside director do not operate 
under the same constraints as inside directors.  This may be especially true in crisis situations 
where outside directors may be more able to exercise control in organisations” (p.284).   We 
therefore expect that having more outside directors on a board is advantageous in that it 
increases the likelihood that poor performing managers will be removed during crises; 
thereby, possibly avoiding failure. 
 
Those arguing in favour of having a board dominated by outside directors propose that the 
independence of inside directors is open to question.  One role of the board is to monitor and 
evaluate top management.  In this respect, insiders directors are seen to be in a position to 
serve their own best interests. 
 
There is evidence that boards with higher proportions of outside directors are more involved 
in strategic decision making (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) and are more likely to be involved in 
strategic restructuring (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993).  These findings indicate that 
outsider representation on boards will be associated with efforts to prevent corporate decline 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994b, p.1606). 
 
As we can see from the preceding arguments there are rather compelling arguments in favour 
of outside directors.  However, some arguments have been made against representation by 
outsiders on boards.  In this regard, it has been suggested that outsiders do not have the time 
and expertise to perform effectively (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p.315).  In addition outsiders 
may find it difficult to “understand the complexities of the company and to monitor its 
operations and, hence, to be fully responsible or effective” (Chaganti et al, 1985, p.407).  
These two arguments would lead us to expect that having more insiders on boards is  
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 conducive to higher corporate performance as these directors can be expected to have more 
time, expertise and knowledge to bring to bear, which will help avoid corporate collapse. 
 
 
2.3 Board Size 
Two explanations have been given to explain why board size may be related to corporate 
performance.  The first explanation takes a resource dependence view, whereby directors are 
seen to link the company with resources from its environment.  This role is seen to be 
particularly important in times of corporate decline, when the necessity for corporations to 
co-opt resources from their environments is inevitably heightened.  Companies with smaller 
boards are seen as being more likely to perform poorly or fail; a small number of board 
members is believed to indicate an inability - or lessened ability - by a firm to co-opt 
resources from its environment that are necessary for survival. 
 
The second explanation for a board size-corporate performance relationship concerns 
centralisation of control.  Of concern here is the extent to which the CEO can influence the 
board.  In this regard, it has been proposed that “larger boards are not as susceptible to 
managerial domination as their smaller counterparts” (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p.309) and, in 
particular, that CEOs are more likely to dominate smaller boards (Chaganti et al, 1985).   
Hence, we can expect that a company with a smaller board is more likely than one with a 
larger board to have poor financial performance.  This is because the CEO and/or other 
executives may have more scope to pursue strategic decisions which go unchecked by 
directors having some degree of impartiality.  The strategic decisions adopted by dominating, 
or autocratic, CEOs have been shown to - in some instances - lead to corporate failure 
(Miller, 1990).  The reason for this is typically viewed to lie in the personality of such 
dominating CEOs.  For example, Kets de Vries and Miller (1985) talk about narcissistic 
CEOs who pursue corporate strategies in an effort to satisfy their own egos, but at the 
expense of the companies they manage. 
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 3. Meta-Analyses 
 
In this section previous studies of board characteristics and financial performance are 
reviewed with the help of meta-analysis.  For each of the board characteristics the following 
procedure was followed: Test statistics reported in previous studies were used to generate an 
effect size r, which is analogous to the point biserial correlation.  Effect sizes were then 
aggregated across studies, weighted by sample size.1 
 
 
3.1 CEO Duality 
In the most recent study of CEO duality Boyd (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of previous 
studies and concluded that these showed that CEO duality has a weak negative relationship 
with firm performance.  However, Boyd missed at least two studies in his meta-analysis 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993) and mistakenly included two other studies (Cannella and 
Lubatkin, 1993; Mallette and Fowler, 1992).2  A revised meta-analysis of CEO duality-
corporate financial performance is shown in Table 1, as are previous studies and two recent 
studies by Boyd (1994, 1995).  We observe from these past studies that the combined mean 
effect size is -0.07.3  This figure, although modest, is statistically significant, and indicates 
that, there is a weak negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate financial 
performance. 
 
One major concern in interpreting these studies is the method of analysis: some of these 
studies are cross-sectional.  The authors of these studies are all to willing to see their findings 
as either supporting a CEO duality-performance relationship, the inference being that CEO 
duality either influences performance or it does no such thing.  This may be the case, 
however an alternative interpretation could be placed upon some research findings in this 
area, namely that past performance causes CEO duality.   
 
Where a positive CEO duality-performance relationship was found it could be argued that 
CEO duality has come about because the company has performed well under the stewardship 
of the CEO.  Here the CEO may be rewarded for improved performance with the additional 
role of board chair.  Alternatively, strong performance may permit CEOs to wield more 
power in terms of board influence, thereby ensuring their election to the additional role of 
board chair. 
                                                 
1  This procedure follows that of Boyd (1995). 
2  In determined prior to the year in which CEO duality was observed.  Therefore these studies 
could only be used to test the proposition that corporate financial peformance leads to CEO 
duality. 
3 Effect size estimates are based on comparison of means, t and F statistics reported in individual studies. 
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Whilst CEO duality has been argued to either positively or negatively influence corporate 
financial performance, the reverse could also be argued.  For example, poor  financial 
performance may lead to CEO duality.  In such cases the role of board chair is likely to be 
both undesirable and onerous, leading to the incumbent board chair to be more willing to 
vacate this position.  Therefore any CEO who wishes to consolidate their position of power 
with an organisation will have an easier job either deposing the current board chair, and 
convincing other directors that such a change is necessary.  This scenario has some support in 
the literature with Mallette and Fowler (1992) finding that ROE averaged over the previous 
three years was negatively correlated with CEO duality. 
 
 
3.2 Outsider Directors 
Outside directors, in the most narrowly defined sense are simply directors who do not 
currently serve in an executive capacity for the company on whose boards they sit.  However, 
a number of broader definitions have been adopted - see Table 2. 
 
Most studies on the debate relating to insider versus outsider directors have used the 
proportion of outside directors as the independent variable.  However, some studies have use 
the proportion of inside directors on the board or even the proportion of insiders to outsiders.  
Table 2 shows a meta-analytic review of previous studies. 
 
One methodological concern in interpreting previous board composition-financial 
performance studies, as was mentioned earlier, and relates to the different definitions of an 
“outside” director.  Thus while some studies take the approach that outsider directors are 
directors who are currently non-executives, others define outsiders as directors who are 
neither current or past executives.  Bearing in mind these differences, the data in Table 2 
could collectively be seen to provide a conservative view of the effect that outside directors, 
defined in their broadest sense, have on corporate financial performance.  The meta-analysis 
of proportion of outside directors and financial performance shows an average effect size of 
0.06, which is statistically significant.  Thus, it appears that having a higher proportion of 
outsiders on corporate boards is associated with increased financial performance.  This 
relationship, although not strong, is significant.  That a positive, rather than a negative, 
relationship is observed when aggregating the findings of previous studies, is of particular 
interest.  This is because, as we have seen, the arguments relating to inside versus outside 
directors, tend to favour representation by outside directors. 
  Table 1 
 CEO Duality and Financial Performance 
 
Study Sample CEO duality 
Definition 
Performance 
Measure(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Effect Size 
Berg and Smith (1978) Fortune 200 firms CEO is also board chair Growth in stock price 
ROI 
ROE 
159 
194 
193
-0.49 
-0.04 
-0.18
Donaldson and Davis (1991) 337 Standard & Poor’s 
companies 
CEO or another 
executive is board chair 
ROE 
Stock returns 
329 
321
0.13 
0.06
Rechner and Dalton (1989) Fortune 500 companies CEO is also board chair Stock returns 141 0.05
Rechner and Dalton (1991) 141 Fortune 500 
companies having, or 
not having, CEO duality 
between 1978 and 1983 
As above ROE 
ROI 
Profit margin 
141 -0.2200 
-0.2700 
-0.2200
Daily and Dalton (1992) 100 firms listed in Inc. 
magazine’s annual 
ranking of the fastest-
growing small publicly 
held companies in the 
U.S. 
As above ROA 
ROE 
P/E ratio 
100 0.0541 
0.0100 
0.0281
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard & Poors 
companies 
As above ROA 
ROE 
P/E ratio 
186 -0.1500 
-0.1100 
-0.0400
Boyd (1994) 193 publicly held 
companies 
headquartered in the 
U.S. in 1980 
As above ROE 193 -0.0470
Boyd (1995) As above As above ROI 193 -0.0300
Combined effect size    -0.0709
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  Table 2 
 Proportion of Outsider Directors and Financial Performance 
 
Study Sample Definition of 
“Outsider” 
Performance 
Measure(s) 
Analysis Sample 
Size 
Effect 
Size 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) 266 Forbes corporations Public directors, 
professional directors, 
private investors and 
independent decision 
makers 
ROE (current) 
ROE (future) 
correlation 266 0.0900 
0.1200 
Cochran, Wood and Jones 
(1985) 
406 Fortune 500 firms for 
the year 1980 
Insiders: current-
employee directors 
ROS 
ROE 
ROA 
Excess value 
correlation 406 0.1100 
0.1100 
0.1800 
0.2000 
Cochran, Wood and Jones 
(1985) 
As above Insiders = current, past 
and affiliate employee-
directors 
ROS 
ROE 
ROA 
Excess value 
correlation 406 0.1600 
0.0700 
0.1500 
0.1400 
Rechner and Dalton (1986) 30 randomly selected 
companies from the top 
100 companies on the 
Fortune 500 
Not defined Month-end stock returns 
Month-end stock returns 
(controlling for firm 
size) 
correlation 30 0.0200 
-0.0040 
Kesner (1987) 250 of the 1983 Fortune 
500 firms 
Not defined (used 
insiders) 
Profit margin  
ROE 
ROA 
EPS 
Stock price 
Return to investors 
(all for 1983) 
correlation 250 -0.1700 
-0.1100 
-0.1600 
-0.1100 
0.1200 
0.1000 
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 Kesner (1987) 221 of the 1983 Fortune 
500 firms for which 
performance data was 
available for 1984-85 
As above Profit margin 
ROE 
ROA 
EPS 
Stock price 
Return to investors 
(for 1984-5) 
correlation 221 -0.0800 
0.0000 
-0.1000 
-0.0600 
-0.1000 
-0.1200 
Hill and Snell (1988) 94 Fortune 500 firms for 
the year 1980, in research 
intensive industries 
Examined ratio of inside 
to outside directors, 
obtained from Dun and 
Bradsheet’s Reference 
Book of Corporate 
Management for 1980 
ROA 
ROA 
correlation 
regression
94 -0.8800 
0.2030 
Zahra and Stanton (1988) Random sample of 1980 
Fortune 500 companies 
Not defined ROE 
Profit margin 
Net sales to equity 
EPS 
DPS 
Log profits  
correlation 100 -0.2000 
-0.1500 
-0.1200 
-0.1600 
-0.4000 
-0.2000 
Schellenger, Wood and 
Tashakori (1989) 
526 firms, randomly 
selected from those firms 
listed on both the 
Compustat Industrial tape 
and the Centre for 
Research in Securities 
Prices 
Not stated (verify) ROE 
ROA 
ROI 
Risk adjusted ROI 
Dividend payout 
Average dividend 
correlation 526 0.0599 
0.1255 
0.0827 
0.1398 
0.0831 
0.1041 
Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan and 
Davidson (1992) 
58 going private 
transactions of NYSE or 
AMEX companies 
between 1983 and 1989 
Proportion of 
independent and 
affiliated outside 
directors on the board 
Proportion of 
independent outside 
directors 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns 
regression 
 
regression
58 0.2608 
 
0.2338 
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 Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan and 
Davidson (1992) 
74 unit management 
buyout transactions of 
NYSE or AMEX 
companies between 1983 
and 1989.   
As above As above As above 74 0.1556 
0.0594 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) 111 NSE or AMEX listed 
firms making 128 
acquisition bids during 
1980-87. 
Directors with no 
affiliation with the firm 
other than their 
directorship 
Two day risk adjusted 
returns 
Two day risk adjusted 
returns 
regression 
 
 
regression
111
111
0.1363 
 
 
0.1593 
Daily and Dalton (1992) 100 firms listed in Inc. 
magazine’s annual 
ranking of the fastest-
growing small publicly 
held companies in the 
U.S. 
Those not in the direct 
employ of the 
organisation 
ROA 
ROE 
P/E ratio 
canonical 
correlation
100 0.1643 
0.0755 
0.3161 
Pearce and Zahra (1992)  119 Fortune 500 
companies 
“Affiliated outsiders” - 
taken from Corporate 
1000 
ROA 
ROE 
EPS 
Net profit margin 
correlation 119 0.2000 
0.2100 
0.1800 
0.0900 
Pearce and Zahra (1992)  As above “Non-affiliated 
outsiders” - taken from 
Corporate 1000 
ROA 
ROE 
EPS 
Net profit margin 
correlation 119 0.1800 
0.2200 
0.3300 
0.1600 
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard and Poors 
companies 
Outsiders were classed 
as those directors not 
currently in the direct 
employ of the 
organisation 
ROA 
ROE 
P/E ratio 
correlation 186 -0.0600 
0.0200 
0.0700 
Boyd (1994) 193 U.S. firms that were 
publicly listed in 1980 
Directors who are also 
serving executives 
(insiders) 
ROE correlation 193 0.0490 
Goodstein, Gautam and 
Boeker (1994) 
334 Californian hospitals Board members who 
were not hospital staff 
or physicians 
Operating margin correlation 334 0.0400 
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 Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein 
(1994) 
369 Standard and Poors 
500 firms, for 1990.  
Excludes regulated 
utilities and financial 
services  corporations 
Directors with no ties to 
the corporation other 
than their board seat 
Market to book value of 
common equity 
correlation 369 -0.1590 
Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein 
(1994) 
As above As above Market to book value of 
common equity 
regression 369 0.1029 
Brickley, Coles and Terry 
(1994) 
247 NYSE and ASE firms 
adopting poison pills over 
1984-86 
Decision makers in 
other firms that do not 
have extensive business 
dealings with the firm as 
well as public directors, 
professional directors 
and private investors. 
Abnormal stock returns regression 247 0.1697 
Brickley, Coles and Terry 
(1994) 
As above Decision makers in 
other firms without 
extensive business ties 
to the sample firm 
As above As above 247 0.0756 
Combined effect size    0.0574 
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 Table 3 
 Board Size and Financial Performance 
 
Study Sample Performance 
Measure(s) 
Analysis Sample 
Size 
Effect 
Size 
Provan (1980) 46 non-profit human 
service agencies 
Amount of intra-
agency funding 
External funding 
Bequests 
correlation 46 0.7700 
 
0.5200 
0.1100
Zahra and Stanton (1988) Random sample of 
1980 Fortune 500 
companies 
ROE 
Profit margin 
Net sales to equity 
EPS 
DPS 
Log profits  
correlation 100 -0.3600 
0.3400 
0.1600 
0.3800 
-0.5500 
0.6800
Pearce and Zahra (1992) 119 Fortune 500 
companies 
ROA 
ROE 
EPS 
Profit margin 
correlation 119 0.2900 
0.2400 
0.3700 
0.1900
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard and 
Poors companies 
ROA 
ROE 
P/E ratio 
correlation 186 -0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1200
Barnhardt, Marr and 
Rosenstein (1994) 
359 Standard and 
Poors 500 firms 
Market to book value correlation 369 0.0360
Goodstein, Gautam and 
Boeker (1994) 
334 Californian 
hospitals 
Operating margin as 
a percentage of net 
revenue 
correlation 335 0.1000 
Combined effect size    0.1326
 3.3 Board Size 
Table 3 shows a meta-analytic review of the board size-performance literature.  In total 16 
effect sizes were determined.  Twelve of these were positive with significant p-values, four 
were non-significant and two were negative and significant.  A significant positive effect size 
of 0.13 is observable from all studies combined, indicating that having a larger board is 
indeed related to higher financial performance.   
 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has added to our understanding of the determinants and performance 
consequences of board structure in several ways.  Meta-analyses show that board size and the 
proportion of outside directors on boards are positively associated with corporate financial 
performance, and that CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance.  
These findings give support to those arguing in favour of outsider representation on boards, 
but do not support those who propose that CEO duality is conducive to improved corporate 
performance. 
 
 14
 References 
 
Addison, R. and Hamilton, R.T. (1988) Company turnarounds in New Zealand. Management 
Forum, 14, 2, 95-103. 
 
Anderson, C.A. and Anthony, R.N. (1986) The new corporate directors. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
 
Argenti, J. (1986) Spot danger signs before it's too late.  Accountancy, 97, July, 101-102. 
 
Barnhart, S.W., Marr, M.W. and Rosenstein, S. (1994) Firm performance and board 
composition: some new evidence.  Managerial and Decision Economics, 15, 4, 329-
340. 
 
Baysinger, B.D. and Butler, H.N. (1985) Corporate governance and the board of directors: 
performance effects of changes in board composition.  Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 1, 1, 101-124. 
 
Berg, S.V. and Smith, K. (1978) CEO and board chairman: a quantitative study of dual vs 
unitary board leadership.  Directors and Boards, 3, 1, 34-39. 
 
Boeker, W. (1992) Power and managerial dismissal: scapegoating at the top. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 37, 3, 400-421. 
 
Boeker, W. and Goodstein, J. (1991) Organizational performance and adaption: effects of 
environment and performance on changes in board composition.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 34, 4, 805-826. 
 
Borch, O.J. and Huse, M. (1993) Informal strategic networks and the board of directors.  
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 18, 1, 23-36. 
 
Boyd, B.K. (1995) CEO duality and firm performance: a contingency model.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 16, 4, 301-312. 
 
Boyd, B.K. (1994) Board control and CEO compensation.  Strategic Management Journal, 
15, 5, 335-344. 
 
Boyd, B.K. (1990) Corporate linkages and organizational environment: a test of the resource 
dependence model.  Strategic Management Journal, 11, 6, 419-430. 
 
Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L. and Terry, R.L. (1994) Outside directors and the adoption of 
poison pills.  Journal of Financial Economics, 35, 3, 371-390. 
 
Byrd, J.W. and Hickman, K.A. (1993) Do outside directors monitor managers? evidence from 
tender offer bids.  Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 2, 195-221. 
 
Cannella, A.A. and Lubatkin, M. (1993) Succession as a sociopolitical process: internal 
impediments to outsider selection.  Academy of Management Journal, 36, 4, 763-793. 
 
Chaganti, R.S., Mahajan, V. and Sharma, S. (1985) Corporate board size, composition and 
corporate failures in the retailing industry.  Journal of Management Studies, 22, 4, 400-
417. 
 15
 Cochran, P.L., Wood, R.A. and Jones, T.B. (1985) The composition of boards of directors 
and incidence of golden parachutes.  Academy of Management Journal, 28, 3, 664-671. 
 
Daily, C.M. (1994) Bankruptcy in Strategic Studies: Past and Promise.  Journal of 
Management, 20, 2, 263-295. 
 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (1994a) Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm: an 
empirical assessment.  Strategic Management Journal, 15, 8, 643-654. 
 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (1994b) Bankruptcy and corporate governance: the impact of 
board composition and structure.  Academy of Management Journal, 37, 6, 1603-1617. 
 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (1993) Board of directors leadership and structure: control and 
performance implications.  Entrepreneruship: Theory and Practice, 17, 3, 65-81. 
 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (1992) The relationship between governance structure and 
coporate performance in entrepreneurial firms.  Entrepreneurship: Theory and 
Practice, 7, 5, 375-386. 
 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H. (1991) Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance 
and shareholder returns.  Australian Journal of Management, 16, 1, 49-64. 
 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, J. and Boeker, W. (1994) The effects of board size and diverstiy on 
strategic change.  Strategic Management Journal, 15, 3, 241-250. 
 
Grinyer, P.H., Mayes, D. and McKiernan, P. (1990) The sharpbenders: achieving a sustained 
improvement in performance.  Long Range Planning, 23, 1, 116-125. 
 
Hambrick, D.C. and D’Aveni, R.A. (1992) Top team deterioration as part of the downward 
spiral of large corporte bankruptcies.  Management Science, 38, 10, 1445-1466. 
 
Hambrick, D.C. and D’Aveni, R.A. (1988) Large corporate failures as downward spirals.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 1, 1-23. 
 
Harrison, J.R., Torres, D.L. and Kukalis, S. (1988) The changing of the guard: turnover and 
structural change in top-management positions.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 
2, 211-232. 
 
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S. (1988) The determinants of board composition.  RAND 
Journal of Economics, 19, 4, 589-606. 
 
Hill, C.W.L. and Snell, S.A. (1988) External control, corporate strategy and firm 
performance in research-intensive industries.  Strategic Management Journal, 9, 6, 
557-590. 
 
Johnson, R.A., Hoskisson, R.E. and Hitt, M.A. (1993) Board of director involvement in 
restructuring: the effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics.  
Strategic Management Journal, 14, Summer, 33-50. 
 
Judge, W.Q. and Zeithaml, C.P. (1992) Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on 
board involvment in the strategic decision process.  Academy of Management Journal, 
35, 4, 766-794. 
 16
  
 
Kesner, I.F. (1987) Directors’ stock ownership and organizational performance: an 
investigation of Fortune 500 companies.  Journal of Management, 13, 3, 499-507. 
 
Kets de Vries, M.F.R. and Miller, D. (1985) Narcissism and leadership: an object relations 
perspective.  Human Relations, 38, 5, 583-601. 
 
Lee, C.I., Rosenstein, S., Rangan, N. and Davidson, W.N. (1992) Board composition and 
shareholder wealth: the case of management buyouts.  Financial Management, 21, 1, 
58-72. 
 
Lorsch, J.W. and MacIver, E. (1989) Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s 
corporate boards. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Mallette, P. and Fowler, K.L. (1992) Effects of board composition and stock ownership on 
the adoption of “poison pills”.  Academy of Management Journal, 35, 5, 1010-1035. 
 
Miller, D. (1990) The Icarus paradox.  New York: Harperbusiness. 
 
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1977) Strategy-making in context: ten empirical archetypes.  
Journal of Management Studies, 14, 3, 253-280. 
 
Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A. (1992) Board composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective.  Journal of Management Studies, 29, 4, 411-438. 
 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978) The external control of organizations: a resource 
dependence perspective.  New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Provan, K.G. (1980) Board Power and Organzational Effectiveness Among Human Service 
Agencies. Academy of Management Journal, 23, 2, 221-236. 
 
Rechner, P. and Dalton, D.R. (1991) CEO duality and organizational performance: a 
longitudinal analysis.  Strategic Management Journal, 12, 2, 155-160. 
 
Rechner, P.L. and Dalton, D.R. (1989) The impact of CEO as board chairperson on corporate 
performance: evidence vs. rhetoric.  Academy of Management Executive, 3, 2, 141-143. 
 
Rechner, P. and Dalton, D.R. (1986) Board composition and shareholder wealth: an empirical 
assessment.  International Journal of Management, 3, 2, 86-92. 
 
Schellenger, M.H., Wood, D.D. and Tashakori, A. (1989) Board of director composition, 
shareholder wealth, and dividend policy.  Journal of Management, 15, 3, 457-467. 
 
Sheppard, J.P. (1994) Strategy and bankruptcy: an exploration into organizational death.  
Journal of Management, 20, 4, 795-833. 
 
Stewart, R. (1991) Chairmen and chief executives: an exploration of their relationship. 
Journal of Management Studies, 28, 5, 511-527. 
 
Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A. (1989) Boards of directors and financial performance: a review 
and integrative model.  Journal of Management, 15, 2, 291-334. 
 17
  18
 
 
Zahra, S.A. and Stanton, W.W. (1988) The implication of board of directors’ composition for 
corporate strategy and performance.  International Journal of Management, 5, 2, 229-
237. 
 
